The U.S. Army’s investigative report on the January 2025 fatal midair collision between an Army Black Hawk helicopter and commercial passenger jet identified “breakdowns across all layers of conflict management” that contributed to the accident.
The report, which was conducted separately from the National Transportation Safety Board’s broader investigation, was completed in May. The families of some of the 67 people killed in the disaser—the deadliest in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) in decades—have been urging its public release.
The Army said systemic failures within “layers of structural, procedural, and technical risk mitigation,” contributed to the tragedy. The report also assigns some blame to the FAA and air traffic control. It did not identify Army decision makers responsible for safety issues or indicate any disciplinary action for leaders, however.
The NTSB last week sent a letter to the Army indicating it was pleased with the branch’s progress implementing seven of the eight recommendations it has received from the agency. The Army’s investigating officer Lieutenant General Michael C. McCurry, who made more than 30 suggestions in the report, endorsed all eight NTSB recommendations.
“The U.S. Army will not waver in our dedication to aviation safety, and we will continue to share our progress transparently as we continue to verify implementation of the investigation’s recommendations,” it said in a news release Thursday.
The branch said that some recommendations have been addressed while others remain in progress. At the same time, the FAA and Congress are working to resolve safety issues identified following the collision, with mixed results. Victims’ families have criticized what they perceive as a lethargic response to the tragedy and urged stakeholders to take immediate action to prevent a future disaster.
Key Takeaways From the Army’s Report
The Army’s partially redacted 50-page investigation was first reported on last week by The Washington Post, after which the branch published it.
Per the report, two broken or “stepped-on” radio transmissions prevented the Black Hawk crew from receiving critical information from ATC regarding the position of American Airlines Flight 5342, a Bombardier CRJ-700 that was approaching to land on Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport’s (KDCA) secondary runway. These were cited by the Army as the “most salient contributing factor” to the accident.
The helicopter’s route intersected the approach path for commercial aircraft landing on KDCA’s runway 33, and the NTSB has criticized the FAA’s authorization and oversight of that route. The Army report also blames the FAA for placing the route too close to the KDCA approach path.
The helicopter route, a portion of which has since been permanently closed, provided for only 75 feet of vertical separation between helicopters traveling along the bank of the Potomac River and aircraft approaching for landing on runway 33, giving crews slim margin for error. On the night of the accident, the Army said the Black Hawk’s altimeter was set incorrectly, and as a result the crew thought the aircraft was flying 100 feet lower than it actually was.
Per the report, the Army did not resolve known accuracy issues affecting altimeters on older Black Hawks. It also did not ensure pilots were adequately informed of the potential for erroneous altimeter readings. The Army subsequently sent out a safety message regarding this issue, but per the Post, a “larger update” will not appear in Black Hawk operator manuals until 2027.
The report further said the Army “lacks a formal near-miss definition and reporting system.” It suggested that the branch study traffic and near-miss data in other cities where it operates helicopters in order to create “heat maps.” An unnamed Army official told ABC News that such a review is ongoing and includes locations such as Los Angeles and the Seattle-Tacoma area.
The FAA earlier in 2026 conducted its own study identifying hundreds of airport “hot spots” on the ground where the potential for runway incursions is heightened.
However, the Army’s investigation noted that coordination between it and the FAA is “lacking,” particularly when it comes to recommending changes to D.C.-area helicopter routes. The regulator has made changes to the airspace around KDCA, including eliminating mixed helicopter and fixed-wing traffic. But the Army suggested tightening its relationship with the agency through more frequent meetings, joint working groups, and data-sharing agreements.
Additional factors cited by the Army included ATC’s use of “non-standard terminology” and provision of “incomplete” advisories, turbulent winds on the night of the accident, and inadequate crew training on D.C. airspace. It also said the combination of bright city lights and the helicopter crew’s use of night vision goggles limited pilots’ field of vision and made it more difficult to spot the CRJ’s external lights.
Steps Taken So Far
The NTSB made eight recommendations to the Army, some of which have been implemented while others remain in progress.
Recommendations included revising training for Army helicopter crews flying near KDCA, addressing the margin of error for Black Hawk altimeter readings, and developing a safety management system that could identify potential midair collisions between Army and civil aircraft. The NTSB also suggested the Army implement new procedures to verify the accuracy of flight data, a NAS-wide helicopter flight data monitoring program, and an ADS-B transponder inspection procedure.
Per a fact sheet shared by the Army, measures taken so far include establishing initial and recurrent training for KDCA aircrews—including instruction on airline approach and departure paths—and routine ADS-B inspections every 90 days. Immediate reforms also addressed “airworthiness, altitude awareness…cockpit traffic-awareness training, command oversight, emergency preparedness, safety reporting, and civil-military coordination,” the Army said Thursday.
The branch said it continues to work toward adding altitude-error information into Black Hawk operator manuals no later than December, as well as developing recurring checks of recorded flight data and pursuing a data-sharing agreement with the FAA.
The FAA too has taken some important steps, including the restrictions on mixed traffic, limiting the use of visual separation procedures, and reviewing mixed traffic at other airports. But the NTSB said in September that the agency’s responses to about one-third of its 33 recommendations have been unacceptable.
The ADS-B Debate
Another recurring theme in the Army’s report was the use of ADS-B transponders and receivers, a topic that the FAA and Congress have been working to address for months.
The accident helicopter was equipped with ADS-B Out capability, but it was inactive on the night of the collision due to improper maintenance. Per the Army’s report, this did not contribute to the crash. But the branch said that “operational risk…[has] created an environment where crews left ADS-B Out off when aviation safety could have been enhanced with the equipment transmitting.”
Per the Army fact sheet, the branch inspected more than 3,500 helicopters affected by ADS-B Out functionality issues about six months after the crash, and it reconfigured them to ensure that those systems are working. McCurry recommended more extensive equipage and mandatory use of ADS-B Out near KDCA.
The Senate-approved ROTOR Act seeks to scale back ADS-B Out exemptions, which per the Army report have been “overapplied.” Families of Flight 5342, which represents loved ones of some of the crash’s victims, has urged lawmakers to “sharply limit” Army ADS-B exemptions.
The report also suggested that the Army require flights in “heavy urban environments” to be equipped with commercial off-the-shelf ADS-B In receivers, which allow aircraft to receive ADS-B Out transmissions, as well as transponders with both ADS-B In and Out capabilities.
The ROTOR Act would immediately mandate ADS-B In for aircraft that already transmit ADS-B Out, which would include military helicopters such as the Black Hawk. Another bill, the House-backed ALERT Act, proposes a slower implementation of ADS-B In and evaluates alternative systems. Families of Flight 5342 has called for an immediate, broad ADS-B In mandate and for the two bills to be reconciled into a single piece of legislation before the 119th Congress ends in early January.
The Pentagon previously lent support to the ROTOR Act but earlier this year reversed that support. Both bills have stalled as lawmakers in both chambers struggle to come to a compromise.
Victims’ loved ones have further called for an independent Army Inspector General inquiry to obtain more clarity on how safety risks were allowed to persist within the Army, as well as on who made what decisions regarding safety.