The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has cited an overloaded aircraft, poor airspeed management, and severe icing conditions as causal factors in the February 2025 crash of Bering Air Flight 445 near Nome, Alaska, which killed all 10 people on board.
In releasing its final report on the accident Thursday, the NTSB said the Cessna 208B Caravan was on the final leg of a scheduled commuter flight to Nome when it crashed onto pack ice about 12 miles offshore of Norton Sound, killing the pilot and all nine passengers.
Photos of the accident scene show the aircraft in pieces and pancaked on the ice flow.
Per the NTSB investigation, the airplane encountered more severe icing conditions than were forecast, which included “large supercooled water droplets.”
The airplane was equipped with a functional Tecalemit-Kilfrost-Sheepbridge Stokes (TKS) ice protection system. Archived electronic data from various onboard avionics systems showed that the airplane’s ice protection system was activated and functioning as designed during the flight and prevented significant ice accumulation on protected surfaces.
However, the NTSB determined that managing the airplane’s ice protection system increased the pilot’s workload during the approach sequence to the airport.
According to the report, at 3:12 p.m. local time the airport closed both runways for deicing, a process expected to take approximately 10-15 minutes. The radar controller advised the pilot of the closure and suggested he “slow down a little bit” to prevent arriving at the airport before the runway was reopened.
The pilot reduced engine power, and the aircraft’s airspeed decreased from 160 knots to about 110. The pilot subsequently added power, and the airspeed increased to 126 knots.
At 3:19 p.m., the airspeed again began to decrease, dropping to 99 knots, which activated the airplane’s low airspeed awareness (LAA) system. As designed, activation of the LAA system resulted in the autopilot disengaging.
At 3:19:46 p.m. the aircraft entered a descent of approximately 2,000 fpm. Data culled from the aircraft’s onboard avionics revealed its pitch attitude reaching its maximum value of about 10-12 degrees nose up, which is consistent with an elevator input by the pilot. The airspeed had dropped to 89 knots.
The aircraft’s descent rate decreased to 1,400 fpm, and over the next 8-9 seconds, the airspeed diminished to 70 knots at an altitude of approximately 3,100 feet msl.
At 3:20:07 p.m. the controller instructed the pilot to climb and maintain 4,000 feet msl, but there was no response. The controller repeated the instruction, but again there was no reply.
The final ADS-B, recorded at 3:20:09 p.m. showed the airplane at an altitude of 1,325 feet msl. The aircraft hit the ice approximately 12 miles offshore of Norton Sound and about 32 miles east of Nome Airport (PAOM).
Probable Cause
NTSB investigators determined the combination of operating the ice protection system and the temporary runway closure “degraded the pilot’s situational awareness, which led to the airspeed decay until the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall from which the pilot did not recover.”
The investigation revealed that the aircraft was operating above its maximum gross weight, which further reduced its stall margin, resulting in a stall at a higher than normal airspeed and, combined with a low altitude, left insufficient time and room for recovery.
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy traveled to Nome after the accident..
“The tragedy of Flight 445 was not the result of a single failure but a series of preventable breakdowns that eroded critical safety margins,” Homendy said. “I’ve seen how Alaskan communities use aviation as a lifeline. Once implemented, our recommendations will make that lifeline safer and prevent other communities from experiencing similar heartbreak.”
Investigation Details
According to the report, the NTSB discovered that Bering Air’s flight risk assessment and operational control procedures failed to prevent routine overweight operations. Per the report, “Investigators identified a pattern of underreported aircraft weights on company load manifests, with several flights operating above weight limitations.”
In addition, the agency also found the Federal Aviation Administration did not increase its oversight of Bering Air despite the operator’s “rapid growth and increased operational complexity following the pandemic and the bankruptcy of a major competitor”.
Recommendations
As a result of this accident, the NTSB issued new safety recommendations to the FAA, including calling for charter, air taxi, and fractional ownership operators to provide pilots with training on how to prevent and recover from a loss of control in flight.
The NTSB also reiterated previous recommendations calling for certificated dispatchers for most Part 135 operators, expanded use of flight data monitoring programs, broader load manifest requirements for Part 135 operations, and crash-resistant flight recorder systems for certain aircraft.